Here are three data points that explain almost everything you need to know about this current moment in American politics.
In 2020, 16 House districts (out of 435) voted for one party for president and a different party for House. That’s 3.6%.
Only 23 districts voted for one party’s presidential nominee in 2020 and then the other party’s House nominee in 2022.1
Of the 35 Senate races contested in 2022, 34 of them were won by the same party that carried the state in the presidential race in 2020. That’s 97%.
The reality exposed by these numbers is glaringly obvious: Voters no longer choose among candidates. They choose among parties. The name on the back of the shirt is, generally, immaterial. The name on the front of the jersey is all that matters.
It was not always so.
Consider that, according to Pew, 192 of 211 Senate races held since 2012 have been won by the party that had won the state in the most recent presidential election. (That’s 91%.)
But that, as recently as 2006, 10 out of the 33 races up that year were won by someone of a different party than the presidential nominee who had won the state most recently.
What happened around 2012 that began this era of ultra-partisanship in which we are in?
The most obvious answer is that over the previous two years, the country’s congressional lines were redrawn in a way designed to fortify incumbents of both parties. It was the second straight redistricting process — over a span of 20 years — that sought to cement both party’s extant strengths.
What that meant, in practical terms, was that there were (and are) simply fewer districts in which either party could win. And far more seats in which the only race that mattered was in the primary — and the way to win that contest was to be the most ideologically extreme candidate in the field, either on the right or the left.
While that might be the most acute explanation for our current ideological moment, the roots go back further.
Some trace it to 1994 and the Republican revolution in which Newt Gingrich weaponized ideology as a way to take over the House — due in no small part to defeating scads of moderate and conservative Democrats especially in the South.
Others point to later that decade and the impeachment of Bill Clinton for his lies about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky as the start of our modern era of partisanship.
What’s clear is that by the early 2000s, we were in the beginning stages of the hyper-partisanship that is now de rigueur in our politics. And, according to this chart from Brookings, the decline in split-ticket voting was well under way by then — although it has quickened in the last 25 years.
Not surprisingly, our politicians started to take notice — voting more and more along purely ideological lines.
This 2022 analysis from Pew is telling in that regard:
Five decades ago, 144 House Republicans were less conservative than the most conservative Democrat, and 52 House Democrats were less liberal than the most liberal Republican, according to the analysis. But that zone of ideological overlap began to shrink, as conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans – increasingly out of step with their caucuses and their constituents – either retired, lost reelection bids or, in a few cases, switched parties.
Since 2002, when Republican Rep. Constance Morella of Maryland was defeated for reelection and GOP Rep. Benjamin Gilman of New York retired, there’s been no overlap at all between the least liberal Democrats and the least conservative Republicans in the House. In the Senate, the end of overlap came in 2004, when Democrat Zell Miller of Georgia retired.
Republicans have grown more extreme than Democrats but both parties have moved toward their own ideological extremes.
This chart — via Pew — makes that change clear:
And this chart — via a 2015 paper on the rise of partisanship in Congress — may be even more revealing about where we’ve been and where we’re headed:
Two things are evident here:
The two parties are now entirely unmixed
Within each party, the voters are more cohesive (as shown by the closeness of the dots to one another).
Taken together, those two facts may well tell the story of our partisan moment best. Not only are there less conservative Democrats or moderate Republicans but there aren’t even any real differences, ideologically speaking, within each of the parties.
Also consider that a) we get the politicians we want (since we vote them in and out) and b) politicians are a reactive species, giving people what they believe they want — thus making their own reelection more likely
Which is to say that we have the government we, at some basic level, deserve. If we are going to reward partisanship — whether through the districts we draw or the people we nominate — we can’t be surprised when those people adhere to rigid ideological standards in the way they vote.
Simply put: If you believe that hyper-partisanship in Congress is a problem, the problem is, well, you.
Both of those stats come courtesy of Inside Elections with Nathan L. Gonzales, which, if you have some extra cash, you absolutely should subscribe to!
And one example I would give is (and I don’t know this as a fact) most people want term limits for Congressmen. But there is no Congressmen that would vote for just a bill. Which would influence the assessment you made. No matter who we vote for there will not be term limits for Congressmen.
Hmmmm. I think there is more to that story.